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ABSTRACT  
This article analyses whether and how public opinion towards the European Union (EU) in 
Greece has changed in the context of the current Eurozone crisis. It provides the first detailed 
treatment of how the crisis has affected citizens’ views in a traditionally pro-European 
member state. It examines whether public opinion has become more Eurosceptic and which 
societal groups have changed their views and in what direction. It uses data from 
Eurobarometer surveys conducted before and during the current crisis. Unsurprisingly the 
findings show that negative sentiment towards the EU has increased across all social groups 
in recent years. However, we find a paradox of a decline in general support for the EU and an 
increase in support for the Euro.  In a country seen as traditionally pro-European, Greek 
public opinion has fallen out of love with the EU, but it clearly does not want to leave the 
Eurozone or renounce membership altogether.  
Keywords: Public opinion; Greece; European Union; Euroscepticism; economic crisis   
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper analyses trends in public support for the European Union (EU) in Greece, the 
Eurozone member most severely affected by the current economic crisis. It provides the first 
detailed understanding of how citizens’ attitudes towards the EU have evolved in response to 
the ongoing economic crisis and related developments in domestic politics. Τhere has been 
recurrent speculation about Greece leaving the Eurozone. Domestically, the crisis has caused 
much political controversy, electoral volatility and civil strife, affecting political parties, 
voting behaviour and the institutions of governance. According to Eurobarometer data, prior 
to the crisis the Greek public was among the most pro-integrationist in the EU. Subsequently, 
in 2007-11 Greece became the member-state with the highest increase in negative attitudes 
towards EU membership, as noted by Serrecchio, Tsakatika and Quaglia (2013). Despite this 
rather startling shift, there has been little analysis of how Greek public opinion may have 
changed in response to the crisis. Have particular societal groups changed their views or has 
there been a more general ‘sea-change’ in attitudes towards European integration within 
Greek society? Has discontent with the EU led to a rise in ‘hard’ Euroscepticism, implying 
rejection of the integration project and of national membership? These are questions of 
critical significance, not only for the future of Greek-EU relations and Greece’s status as a 
longstanding pro-integration member state, but also because of their wider implications for 
the impact of economic crisis on support for European integration.  
Using data from the bi-annual Eurobarometer surveys conducted before and during 
the crisis, the present article analyses general support for the EU and attitudes towards the 
single currency. The paper contributes to research into party-based and popular 
Euroscepticism and the role of the EU issue in the member states of Southern Europe 
(Verney 2011a, 2011b; Costa Lobo and Magalhães 2011; Ruiz Jiménez and Egea de Haro 
2011; Quaglia 2011; Llamazares and Gramacho 2007; Mavris 2004) and to recent analysis of 
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public attitudes in the context of the Eurozone crisis (Serrecchio et al. 2013). It also 
contributes to the wider public opinion literature on explaining general support for the EU 
(McLaren 2006; Hooghe and Marks 2004, 2005; Gabel 1998). Beyond this, the paper aims to 
deepen our understanding of the impact of the crisis on the EU member-states and of how this 
may affect the future prospects of the integration project itself.   
The paper is structured as follows. First, it sets out the wider context of Greece and 
the Eurozone crisis. Second, it examines how public opinion towards the EU has changed 
over time in the context of the crisis. Third, it looks more closely at whether and how the 
opinions of different social groups towards the EU have changed. Fourth, it sets out the 
multivariate analysis of Greek attitudes towards the EU using the most recently-available 
survey data. Fifth, it presents the main findings from the multivariate analysis. Finally, it 
concludes the analysis. 
 
GREECE AND THE EUROZONE CRISIS: THE RE-EMERGENCE OF EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION AS A CONTESTED ISSUE  
The Greek crisis began in in October 2009 with the admission by the newly elected Greek 
Socialist government that Greece was running an unsustainably high budget deficit and 
public debt. The public revelations concerning the true state of the Greek economy and the 
manifest reluctance of the EU leadership to provide guarantees against the sovereign default 
of a Eurozone member triggered a crisis of confidence in the financial markets which rapidly 
developed into a sovereign debt crisis.  
After Greece was definitively excluded from international financial markets in the 
Spring of 2010, the EU finally intervened, offering a joint EU/IMF loan in May 2010, 
followed by a second bailout accompanied by private sector sovereign-debt restructuring in 
March 2012, and then another minor debt ‘haircut’ in November 2012. The bailouts were 
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granted in exchange for a programme of drastic deficit reduction, imposing severe austerity, 
and of deep structural reforms, including the reduction of the minimum wage and the rolling 
back of labour rights. The international creditors were unambiguous about the loss of Greek 
economic sovereignty. Implementation of the programme was monitored on a regular basis 
by the “troika”, consisting of representatives of the European Commission (EC), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European Central Bank (ECB), who regularly 
threatened to recommend the withholding of loan instalments if the Greek government did 
not meet its targets.  
For the Greek public, the EU thus became inextricably linked with a fiscal adjustment 
programme and a loss of sovereignty. As the pain of the deepening crisis and the drastic 
reduction of state provision were increasingly felt across Greek society, the initial relief of 
avoiding default and a disorderly departure from the Eurozone and possibly even the EU, was 
increasingly replaced by the feeling that the effects of these measures represented an unfair 
and indiscriminate punishment, particularly targeting vulnerable population groups such as 
the young unemployed and elderly pensioners. The EU role in the design and implementation 
of the Greek adjustment programme meant that disaffection with the latter seemed likely to 
produce a eurosceptic response.  
 Such a response could reflect a crisis of ‘output legitimacy’, given that the EU can no 
longer guarantee prosperity and growth for its citizens but instead has become involved in the 
delivery of harsh austerity. The crisis has also brought a crisis of ‘input legitimacy’. In the era 
of the EU/IMF bailouts, citizens in Greece have become increasingly aware that they can no 
longer influence public policy through traditional forms of political participation, such as 
voting in national elections, because the main policy directions are laid out in the agreements 
with the international lenders and cannot be changed. This is in line with Peter Mair’s (2011, 
p. 15) concluding remarks in his paper discussing the impact of the crisis on political 
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representation in Ireland: that ‘this signals the onset of failure of representation and 
democracy without choices’ (see also Krastev 2002).  
The realisation that the EU matters a lot could trigger a positive process whereby 
citizens demand to become more actively involved in debates on the future of the integration 
process, the content of EU policies, their ideological direction and their impact on questions 
of equity and solidarity within their societies. However, it could also trigger a negative 
response, possibly leading even to a popular rejection of European integration itself. In order 
to see what is actually happening in Greece, let us now turn to the data.     
 
GREECE AND THE EU: THE CHANGING FACE OF PUBLIC OPINION OVER 
TIME 
Greece is one of the member states traditionally labelled as ‘pro-European’, and this is 
evident in relation to public opinion from the time series data presented in Figures 1 and 2. 
Trend data are shown for public opinion in Greece and for the EU as a whole (reflecting the 
number of member states at each point in time), based on two longstanding questions which 
have been asked regularly in Eurobarometer surveys. Notwithstanding some fluctuation of 
opinion, it is clear that before the crisis, there were generally high levels of support for 
Greece’s EU membership, expressed as agreement with the statements that Greece has 
benefitted from membership and that membership has been ‘a good thing’. When comparing 
the time series, it is also evident that there has been greater support for membership in Greece 
than across the EU as a whole.  
[Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
Next, we turn to the period of crisis and examine the rise in negative sentiment. 
Figure 3 uses various indicators of public opinion, including the two Eurobarometer 
questions used in Figures 1-2, but this time focusing on the eurosceptic responses, as well as 
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a further three questions designed to measure general attitudes towards the EU. Given that 
some of these questions have not featured in Eurobarometer surveys over an extended time 
period, we report data for the period 2003-2012 (or the most recently available data). For 
each indicator we report the proportions holding negative views: 
 Those who say Greece has not benefitted from EU membership. 
 Those who say Greece’s membership is a bad thing. 
 Those who tend not to trust the EU. 
 Those who have a very or fairly negative image of the EU. 
 Those who think that the EU is going in the wrong direction. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
The trend is very clear. During the first year after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, 
the general view in Greece was that the international crisis would not really affect the 
country, while it was felt that participation in the euro offered Greece protection, especially in 
comparison to the sharp decline suffered by the Swedish kroner. This is reflected in our 
negative indicators, which all show a small decline in Greek negative sentiment during this 
period. This is followed by a sharp jump in all cases between Autumn 2009 and Spring 2010 
– the period identified earlier in this article as the real beginning of the crisis as far as Greek 
public opinion was concerned. Subsequently, all indicators show increasing levels of negative 
sentiment, climbing steadily.  
Specifically, in a period of three years, on the three indicators measuring general 
attitudes towards the EU, the proportion of Greek respondents holding a negative image of 
the EU almost tripled (from 14% in November 2009 to 49% in November 2012), while those 
tending not to trust the EU and those believing the EU was going in the wrong direction more 
than doubled (from 38% to 81% and from 31% to 74% respectively). On the latter two 
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indicators, the overwhelming majority of Eurobarometer’s Greek sample now has a negative 
stance. The two indicators measuring attitudes towards national membership of the EU were 
somewhat controversially discontinued by Eurobarometer after the Spring 2011 survey. 
However, in the 18-month period separating the latter from the beginning of the crisis, those 
regarding EU membership as ‘a bad thing’ jumped from 13% to 33%. This made Greece in 
Spring 2011 the EU member-state with the highest proportion of respondents giving a 
negative answer to this question, marginally ahead of the traditionally eurosceptic UK. 
Meanwhile, between November 2009 and May 2011, those Greek citizens who considered 
the country had not benefitted from membership doubled from 25% to 50%, the second 
highest proportion in the EU (this time behind the UK).  
Does this mean that three decades after accession, the crisis had turned the Greek 
population into ‘hard’ eurosceptics? The data do not support such an interpretation. While all 
our indicators showed a sharp upward trend, they also display significant quantitative 
differences. In May 2011 (the last occasion on which it is possible to compare the two 
indicators), while almost three-quarters of the Greek sample agreed the EU was going in the 
wrong direction, only one-third concurred with the statement that EU membership was ‘a bad 
thing’. It is also worth noting that on the membership question, while in May 2011 Greece 
had the highest level of negative responses in the EU (33%), the hard Eurosceptics were still 
outnumbered by those who regarded EU membership as ‘a good thing’ (38%). This was not 
the case in the UK, where those with a positive evaluation of EU membership (26%) were 
significantly fewer than the ‘hard’ Eurosceptics (32%). What the Eurobarometer data suggest, 
therefore, is that while the Greek population has clearly lost its former enthusiasm for the EU, 
it has moved in a Euro-critical rathe than a Euro-rejectionist direction.  
Perhaps the most striking indication of this is provided by the issue of the single 
currency, one of the EU’s flagship initiatives. During the economic crisis, the very real 
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prospect of ‘Grexit’ – a probably disorderly Greek departure from the Eurozone – meant that 
this was the issue on which the country was facing an immediate ‘in’ or ‘out’ dilemma. 
Figure 4 charts longer-term attitudes towards the single currency, covering a period of more 
than two decades from 1990-2012. The data are based on questions whose wording has 
altered in successive Eurobarometer surveys to reflect the various stages of development of 
EMU and the single currency. The figure displays public support in Greece over time.  
Generally, levels of support in Greece have been high over time, though they have fluctuated, 
in particular falling after the introduction of the Euro. Support for the euro, though, has risen 
again since the beginning of the crisis, providing an interesting counterpoint to the direction 
of public opinion evident for the various indicators shown in Figure 3. Compared to the EU 
average (not shown here), the single currency was more popular in Greece during the 1990s, 
less popular once the euro was introduced but has once again become more popular since the 
beginning of the international economic crisis. In the most recent survey for which data are 
available (autumn 2012), 65% of the Greek sample were in favour of the euro compared to 
53% across the EU.  
[Figure 4 about here] 
The examination of the longitudinal data thus suggests that the majority of Greek 
public opinion has lost confidence in the EU and disagrees with its current direction, but 
clearly wants to remain within the Eurozone: an attitude that could be described as ‘We no 
longer love you, but we don’t want to leave you’. The next section examines the changing 
dynamics of opinion across social groups. 
 
GREECE AND THE EU: CHANGES IN GROUP ATTITUDES, 2003-07 AND 2007-11 
This section focuses on group attitudes for three Eurobarometer questions at three points in 
time, using data from surveys conducted in 2003, 2007 and 2011. The questions utlised in 
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this section are the following: whether EU member ship is a good thing, a bad thing or 
neither; whether the country has benefitted  or not from EU membership; and whether for or 
against a single currency. Table 1 shows the overall distribution of opinion in Greece for 
these three questions and Table 2 presents changes in opinion for 2003-2007 and 2007-2011 
for societal groups classified by sex, age, education and occupational status. Table 2 reports 
the changes in negative sentiment:  
 Those who think that membership is a bad thing;  
 Those who think their country has not benefitted from membership; and  
 Those who are against the single currency.  
Looking first at Table 1, we can see that the overall proportion who believe their 
country has not benefitted barely changed between 2003 and 2007 but then rose substantially 
between 2007 and 2011 (by 32.9%). Looking at the breakdown for the various social 
categories, we can see that, while there was mixed response from groups in the 2003-2007 
period, there was a uniformly strong shift in negative sentiment in the latter period. All 
groups evince large increases in those who perceive that Greece has ‘not benefitted’ from 
membership. Is there a similar pattern for opinion of whether EU membership is a bad thing? 
Between 2003 to 2007 there is a near-uniform picture of small shifts in a negative direction 
amongst social groups, with the only exception being those who left education aged 20 years 
and over (showing a decrease of just 0.6% in negative sentiment). Between 2007 and 2011, 
there is a similar uniformly strong shift in a negative direction, with all groups showing 
sizeable increases in those responding ‘a bad thing’. For both of these indicators of negative 
sentiment, there are large shifts across all social and economic groups; while the extent of the 
change may vary, the direction does not.  
 
[Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
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Looking at attitudes towards the single currency, there was a strong shift in a negative 
direction between 2003 and 2007, again occuring across all social and economic groups.  The 
proportion against the single currency rose from 33.8% in 2003 to around half in 2007 
(49.4%). This coincides with the introduction of the euro and can be explained by the latter’s 
association with inflation. However, the opposite occured between 2007 and 2011, with a 
substantial decline in negative sentiment to 20.6%. In both periods the extent of the 
attitudinal change varies across social and econoic groups, but the direction of change is 
always the same. Of the three indicators, attitudes towards the single currency therefore 
display the greatest contrast between the two periods captured in Table 2. Even during a 
period – 2007-11 - when the public mood was clearly growing dissatisfied with Greece’s 
membership of the EU, support for one of the EU’s flagship projects was considerably 
strengthened and, moreover, outpaced support across the EU as a whole. 
Data from the most recently-released EB survey (autumn 2013) confirm strong 
support for the single currency (62.0 per cent in Greece compared to 52.0 per cent across the 
EU as a whole). But the negative sentiment towards the EU clearly remains: 54.0 per cent 
have a negative image of the EU; 72.0 per cent think it is going in the wrong direction; and 
77.0 per cent tend not to trust the EU (European Commission 2013). This suggests that the 
crisis seems to have convinced Greeks that the single currency offers a safe haven in the 
storm. Thus, in Greece, the crisis has clearly produced a crisis of confidence in the EU; 
however, this does not extend to rejection of European integration. This interpretation is 
further underlined by a question only recently included in EB surveys, asking whether 
member states would be better off outside the EU: in response, a majority in Greece 
disagreed (57.0 per cent), with 38.0 per cent agreeing and just 5.0 per cent unsure (European 
Commission 2013). 
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GREECE AND THE EU: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES 
This section introduces the data source and measurement of dependent and independent 
variables before presenting and discussion the findings from the model estimations. 
 
Data source and dependent variables 
The data for this analysis come from three surveys. First, the autumn 2007 Eurobarometer 
survey (EB68.1); secondly, the spring 2011 Eurobarometer survey (EB75.3); and, thirdly, the 
spring 2012 Eurobarometer survey (EB77.3). The sample sizes for Greece comprise 
approximately 1,000 respondents in each Eurobarometer survey. The first stage involves 
multivariate analysis of public attitudes in Greece using the autumn 2007 survey. The second 
stage involves analysis of the spring 2011 and spring 2012 surveys, due to the availability of 
key indicators of support. Specifically, the two questions on EU membership were last asked 
in the spring 2011 surveys while the question on support for the single currency was last 
administered in the spring 2012 survey. The distribution of opinion for the dependent 
variables in the 2007 and 2011/12 surveys is shown in Table 3 (indicating the extent of 
change between the two time-points). 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
For all analyses the dependent variables are measured so that the Eurosceptic 
responses are scored as 1 and pro-EU or neutral responses are scored as 0: 
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 Those who say their country has not benefitted from membership are scored as 1 
while those who say it has benefitted are scored 0. 
 Those who say membership is a bad thing are scored as 1 and those who respond a 
good thing or neither good nor bad are scored as 0.  
 Those who are against the single currency are scored as 1 and those who are in favour 
of it are scored as 0.  
 
We use binary logistic regression analysis, suitable for dichotomous dependent variables. 
Missing data are excluded from the analysis.  
 
Independent variables 
The independent variables used here are informed by the main theoretical approaches used in 
the wider literature on public opinion towards the EU. These approaches relate to economic 
interests, group identities, and political cues (McLaren 2006; Hooghe and Marks 2005, 2004). 
Survey data permitting, we operationalise a range of independent variables which reflect 
insights from the economic interests and political cues approaches. Due to the lack of suitable 
measures for group identities or attachments being available in all EB surveys and since we 
aim to use equivalent model specifications for the multivariate analyses of the 2007 and 2011 
surveys, we do not examine their impact in this paper.  
It has been well-established that citizens’ economic interests and material 
circumstances are important determinants of their views towards the integration process 
(McLaren 2006; Hooghe and Marks 2005, 2004). In particular, economic integration – and 
major projects such as the Single Market and EMU - has varying consequences for citizens in 
the member states, leading to winners and losers from a country’s EU membership. 
According to existing studies of public attitudes towards the EU, those with higher levels of 
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education or who are in higher-level occupations are more likely to benefit from economic 
integration (Hooghe et al. 2007; McLaren 2006; Gabel 1998), including particular policies 
such as the Single Currency.  
As well as ‘objective’ indicators of socio-economic location ‘subjective’ assessments 
of personal and national economic conditions have also been shown to be consequential for 
attitudes on EU-related issues (Hooghe and Marks 2005; Gabel and Whitten 1997; Anderson 
1998). Positive appraisals of past or future economic performance or conditions are thought 
to underpin support for the EU and its policies. As de Vreese et al. observe: ‘the “subjective 
utilitarian model” suggests that European integration is supported if perceptions and future 
evaluations of the economy are positive’ (2008, p. 513).  
We use both objective and subjective indicators of socio-economic circumstances. 
The former is measured, first, by the age at which an individual finished their education 
(measured as a series of dummy variables: aged 15 and under; 16 to 19 years; 20 and over; 
still in education). It is measured, second, by occupational status (dummies for self-
employed, in manual employment, in non-manual employment, or not currently working – a 
student, retired, unemployed, or a home person). We use retrospective assessment of the 
national economy as our subjective indicator of socio-economic circumstances. Higher scores 
represent more positive assessments.  
While it may be a powerful determining factor, public opinion towards the EU is not 
only influenced by individuals’ economic interests. Indeed earlier ‘accounts of attitudes 
towards European integration resemble the old adage of “where you stand determines where 
you sit”, and are almost exclusively concerned with economic utilitarianism’ (McLaren 2006, 
p. 31). Public opinion is also shaped by the domestic political context of member states. 
Increasingly, research into public opinion and the EU has found that citizens rely on cues and 
proxies rooted in domestic politics to form opinions about the integration process (Anderson 
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1998; Sanchez-Cuenca 2000). Indeed, because of the complex and multifaceted nature of 
multi-level governance within the EU, ‘one would expect domestic politics to shape public 
views on European integration’ (Hooghe and Marks 2005, p. 425). While unfortunately 
measures of party support are not available in the surveys used here, we can employ measures 
of frequency of political discussion or level of interest in politics. We also examine trust in 
governing institutions – specifically, whether respondents tend to trust or tend not to trust the 
national parliament and government. Finally, in order to reduce the chances of omitted 
variable bias, all models employ socio-demographic controls for gender (scored as 1 if male 
and 0 if female) and age (a continuous variable). A summary of the independent variables is 
provided in the Appendix.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
The binary logistic regression results for the 2007 survey are shown in Table 4 and for the 
2011/12 surveys in Table 5. In contrast to the earlier analysis of change in social group 
attitudes, this section reports two sets of cross-sectional analyses. The same model 
specification is used for the three dependent variables, to permit comparison of the effects of 
the independent variables across models and time points. First, looking at the results reported 
in Table 5, it is clear that gender has a consistent impact in all three models. Compared to 
women, men are less likely to think Greece does not benefit from membership or is a bad 
thing, and less lkely to be against the single currency. Age is only significant in the third 
model (single currency), where older people are less likely to be against the Euro. In terms of 
the objective indicators of socio-economic circumstances, the reusults are rather patchy, with 
both education and occupation having more effect in the model of attitudes towards the single 
currency. Here, those who left education aged 16-19 years or 20 and over, as well as those 
still in education, are less likely to be against the Euro compared to those who left education 
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aged 15 or under. In relation to occupational status, those in manual employment are more 
likely to be against the Euro compared to those not currently in work. However, the 
occupational status dummies have no effects in the first two models (not benefit from 
membership and membership is a bad thing).  
 Turning to the attitudinal variables, these have collectively larger impact and the 
direction of the relatinships are generally the same across the different specifications of the 
dependent variables. Higher life satisfaction has consistent effects: it is negatively-related to 
thinking Greece has not benefitted from membership, believing membership is a bad thing, 
and  being against the single currency. Frequency of discussion of politics similarly has a 
consistent  and negatively-signed relationship with the three dependent variables. Greater 
discussion of politics leads to less likelihood of holding anti-EU views and being opposed to 
the Euro. Economic perceptions also have signifciant effects in all three models: positive 
economic appraisals of the national economy are negatively related to anti-EU attitudes and 
being opposed to the Euro. It appears then that the wider economic context is shaping the 
attitudes of Greek citizens towards both membership of the EU and their country’s 
involvement in the Euro. Finally, it is clear that political attitudes rooted in the domestic 
context – which can act as ‘cues’ or ‘proxies’ are shaping public opinion on membership and 
the single currency. Specifically, those who tend to trust national political institutions – the 
government and parliament – who less likely to hold unfavourable assessmens of EU 
membership and be against the Euro. This findings confirms insights from the political cues 
approach  
 
[Tables 4 and 5 about here] 
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 Turning to the results for the spring 2011 and spring 2012 surveys reported in Table 5, 
we can see than there is a mixed performance for the socio-demographic and socio-ecnomic 
variables. In particular, education has stronger effects in Table 5 than in Table 4 and is a 
more potent explanatory factor than is occupational status. Generally, those who left aged 20 
years and over, or who are still in some form of education, are less likely to hold negative 
views of membership and the Euro compared to those who finished education at an earlier 
age. This is also the case for those who finished education aged 16-18 years, but only for 
opinion towards the single currency. The occupational status variables have no significant 
impact in the model of attitudes towards the Euro. In the models of general support for 
membership, manual workers are more likely to think that membership is a bad thing and 
those in non-manual employment are more likely to think that the country has not benefitted 
from being in the EU, but these are otherwise isolated effects as occupational status performs 
poorly overall.  Age again has a significat effect on opinion towards the single currency in 
2012, with older people less likely to be opposed. 
As with the results from Table 4, all of the attitudinal variables – with the exception 
of subjective economic perceptions - have consistent and significant effects on general 
support for the EU. Evaluations of the national economy are only sigificant in the first model, 
relating to views as to whether Greece has benefitted from its membership. Again, positive 
retrospective assessments of the national economic sitation are negatively-related to 
unfavourable views of the EU. In contrast to Table 4, however, this variable has no 
significant  impact in the other two models. Next, general life satisfaction again is related to 
less likelihood of holding negative views of the EU, as was evident in Table 4. With the 
exception of trust in government in the model assessing attitudes towards the single currency, 
the measures of trust in political insitutions have significant effects in all models, again 
supporting the political ‘cues’ approach to explaining public support for Euroepan 
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integration. Those who tend to trust either parliament or the government are less likely to 
hold unfavourable views of EU membership and the Euro.  
Taken together, the findings for evaluations of national political institutions support 
one set of findings from the political ‘cues’ approach (Anderson 1998; Sanchez-Cuenca 
2000). Specifically, we find that positive attitudes towards the national parliament and 
government are less likely to be related to opposition to the EU and single currency, rather 
than the opposite relationship, whereby some previous studies have found that negative views 
of domestic institutions are related to greater support for the EU and its institutions (Sanchez-
Cuenca 1998). Also, there are similar effects for subjective economic perceptions acros 
models, which are again in keeping with established findings from the wider literature. That 
is, positive appraisals of the national economy are less likely to be related to negative 
evaluations of the EU and the Euro (Gabel and Whitten 1997). Finally, in relation to 
objective economic interests, although the results are less impressive and consistent overall, 
when they are signficant we find that those groups who we would expect to be more secure in 
their economic circumstances – precisely those groups thought to have the human capital to 
take advantage of the opportunitieis offered by membership and key elements, such as the 
single market and its economic freedoms – are less likely to be unfavourable towards the EU 
and the Euro (Gabel 1998). The results here for individuals’ economic cirucmstances and 
public attitudes towards the EU are interesting in the light of Roth et al’s findings that, 
amongst the four member states at the centre of the crisis- Greece, Spain, Portugal and 
Ireland - there has been a more pronounced fall – than across the European Area-12 - in 
public trust in the European Central Bank, which has been driven by increasing 
unemployment rates (special issue).  
 
CONCLUSION 
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For the majority of Greek citizens, the EU was always positively associated with democracy, 
economic prosperity and a move away from the inherent weaknesses of national politics. The 
handling of the Eurozone crisis has changed this. The empirical analyses reported in this 
paper shed important new light on the response of Greek public opinion in the context of the 
current crisis. In particular, the detailed single-country focus (the ‘microscopic’ approach) 
complements broader cross-national research (the ‘telescopic’ approach) on public opinion 
towards the EU in the context of the crisis, which also finds changes in political support 
across member states (Braun and Tausendpfund, special issue). The traditional picture of 
Greece as a ‘pro-European’ member state, a characteristic it shared with other southern 
European countries, has changed during the period of economic crisis. The longitudinal 
evidence examined here show that negative evaluations of the EU increased sharply between 
2007 and 2011 in contrast to the steady high levels of pro-European sentiment during the 
previous two decades. Our breakdown of opinion by social groups shows that this shift in 
negative opinion is a ‘sea change’ affecting society as a whole, with all social groups sharing 
in it.  
The fact that public opinion in Greece has turned more Eurosceptic it is hardly 
surprising. What is surprising though is that the decline in general EU support is 
accompanied by increase in support for the euro. Support for the single currency has 
increased between 2007 and 2011 and is now higher in Greece than the EU as a whole. This 
is also confirmed by the most recently-released EB survey (autumn 2013).  What can account 
for the coexistence of these contradictory opinions? We argue that this picture is closely 
linked to the wider debate about the change from a ‘permissive consensus’ to a ‘constraining 
dissensus; and the fact that European integration has become more politicised in the member 
states (Hooghe and Marks, 2008). Increase in public disenchantment with the EU is often 
seen as indication of a rejection of European integration and an obstacle to further 
integration. We argue that the picture in Greece supports a different interpretation to that of 
‘constraining dissensus’. Instead of Greek citizens wanting less Europe, their critical attitudes 
represent a move away from the norm of consensus governance and depoliticisation of the 
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content of EU policies to one of conflict and politicisation. The majority of Greek people 
seem to adopt a pragmatic approach where they are aware that being in the Euro and the EU 
is the realistic alternative despite the pain of austerity policies domestically. However, they 
are also signalling their discontent with the lack of effective solutions from Europe in terms 
of outputs. 
future research to investigate the links between the positions of political parties and 
the opinions of their supporters. This is particularly important given the changing political 
and electoral landscape in Greece – including the increasing prominence of minor parties 
with Eurosceptic platforms - within the context of the unfolding Eurozone crisis. Such 
research should be accompagnied by an analysis of how the EU issue in the context of the 
crisis has changed in Greece in terms of its salience for and the and positioning of, the 
mainstream and non-mainstream parties, as Hutter and Kerscher have shown for France 
(special issue) where there has been greater politicization of the European intregration issue.    
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APPENDIX: INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Variable Measurement 
Sex Dummy variable (1=male, 0 if female). 
Age Continuous variable (15 years and upwards). 
Education Measured as the age a respondent finished full-time 
education. Dummy variables: aged 15 and under, 16-18 
years, 19 and over, still in education. Those who left 
education aged 15 and under are the reference category. 
Occupation Dummy variables: self-employed, manual occupation, non-
manual occupation, other (retired, student, unemployed, 
house person). The ‘other’ group forms the reference 
category. 
Satisfaction with life Scale ranging from 1 to 4. Higher values represent greater 
life satisfaction. 
Economic perceptions Retrospective evaluations of the national economy. Scale 
scored from 1 to 4. Higher scores represent more positive 
evaluations. 
Trust in national 
government 
Dummy variable scored 1=tend to trust and 0=tend not to 
trust. 
Trust in national 
parliament 
Dummy variable scored 1=tend to trust and 0=tend not to 
trust. 
Political interest / 
discussion  
Scale scored from 1 to 4. Higher scores represent more 
frequent discussion of politics (EB68.1, EB77.3) or greater 
interest in politics (EB75.3). 
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Figure 1: Long-term attitudes towards the EU: Benefitted from membership 
 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys. 
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Figure 2: Long-term attitudes towards the EU: Membership is a good thing 
 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys. 
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Figure 3: Indicators of negative sentiment in Greece towards the EU  
 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys. 
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Figure 4: Attitudes towards the single currency 
 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys. 
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Table 1: Overall distribution of opinion in Greece 
  2003 (%) 2007 (%) 2011 (%) 
Benefitted from membership 
Benefitted 75.0 80.1 47.5 
Not benefitted 16.6 17.0 49.9 
Don't know 8.4 2.9 2.6 
Membership is a good thing 
A good thing 61.9 61.8 37.7 
Neither good nor bad 29.7 29.9 33.5 
A bad thing 6.7 7.9 27.9 
Don't know 1.7 0.5 1.0 
Single currency    
For 64.0 50.4 75.5 
Against 32.7 49.2 19.6 
Don't know 3.3 0.4 4.9 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys. 
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Table 2: Changes in social group attitudes, 2003-2007 and 2007-2011 
 Not benefitted A bad thing Against single currency 
 
Change:  
2003-2007 
Change:  
2007-
2011 
Change:  
2003-2007 
Change:  
2007-20011 
Change:  
2003-2007 
Change:  
2007-2011 
Male 0.6 33.5 0.4 26.0 16.3 -25.5 
Female 0.2 32.6 2.0 25.3 16.9 -33.5 
Aged 15-34 -1.9 29.7 2.0 20.2 10.5 -20.2 
Aged 35-54 1.7 36.7 1.1 26.1 20.5 -28.0 
Aged 55-64 5.3 31.6 0.0 31.6 19.8 -31.6 
Aged 65+ -0.9 33.3 0.9 30.4 18.2 -47.0 
15 or under 2.8 35.5 3.2 33.4 19.5 -41.8 
16 to 19 0.1 41.0 0.1 16.7 17.0 -26.5 
20 and over -3.8 25.4 -0.6 16.7 16.1 -26.2 
Still in 
education 
2.6 15.4 0.7 4.7 10.9 -10.8 
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Non-manual -5.9 31.1 0.5 19.9 20.8 -31.5 
Manual 8.0 44.1 2.0 35.5 23.8 -34.0 
Self-employed 11.1 30.6 2.5 31.0 18.4 -21.1 
Other 0.4 31.1 0.9 23.6 12.6 -30.7 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys. 
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Table 3: Distribution of opinion for the dependent variables 
 Autumn 
2007 
(%) 
Spring 2011a 
/ Spring 
2012b (%) 
Change 
Benefitted from membership a  
Benefitted 80.1 47.5 -32.6 
Not benefitted 17.0 49.9 +32.9 
Don’t know 2.9 2.6 -0.3 
Membership is a good thing a  
Good thing 61.8 37.7 -24.1 
Neither 29.9 27.9 -2.0 
Bad thing 7.9 33.5 +25.6 
Don’t know 0.5 1.0 +0.5 
Single currency b  
For 50.4 74.8 +24.4 
Against 49.2 20.6 -28.6 
Don’t know 0.4 4.6 +4.2 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys. 
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Table 4:  Binary logistic regression estimations (EB AUTUMN 2007) 
 
NOT BENEFITTED FROM 
MEMBERSHIP  
MEMBERSHIP IS A BAD 
THING 
AGAINST SINGLE 
CURRENCY 
  B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B) 
Sex -0.51** 0.20 0.60 -0.46*** 0.16 0.63 -0.40*** 0.15 0.67 
Age 0.01 0.01 1.01 0.01 0.01 1.01 0.01** 0.01 1.01 
Left education: Aged 16-19 -0.45* 0.26 0.64 -0.12 0.21 0.89 -0.55*** 0.20 0.57 
Left education: Aged 20+ -0.59* 0.32 0.55 -0.24 0.25 0.79 -0.60*** 0.23 0.55 
Still in education 0.06 0.46 1.06 -0.52 0.38 0.60 -0.68* 0.35 0.51 
Occupation: Self-employed 0.07 0.31 1.07 -0.05 0.25 0.95 0.10 0.23 1.10 
Occupation: Manual 0.50 0.32 1.65 0.23 0.25 1.26 0.56** 0.24 1.75 
Occupation: Non-manual -0.13 0.37 0.87 0.07 0.27 1.08 -0.20 0.25 0.82 
Discuss politics 0.10 0.13 1.10 -0.12 0.11 0.89 -0.20** 0.10 0.82 
Life satisfaction -0.49*** 0.13 0.61 -0.34*** 0.11 0.71 -0.24** 0.10 0.78 
National economy -0.58*** 0.15 0.56 -0.54*** 0.11 0.58 -0.40*** 0.11 0.67 
35 
 
Trust government -0.84*** 0.27 0.43 -0.73*** 0.20 0.48 0.08 0.19 1.09 
Trust parliament -0.48** 0.24 0.62 -0.77*** 0.18 0.46 -0.50*** 0.18 0.60 
Constant 1.21* 0.67 3.36 2.37*** 0.53 10.72 1.99*** 0.50 7.30 
Weighted N 959 982 984 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.22 0.26 0.17 
Note: ***p≤.01; **p≤.05; *p≤.10. Omitted reference categories: left education aged 15 or under; not in work. 
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Table 5:  Binary logistic regression estimations (EB SPRING 2011a AND EB SPRING 2012b) 
 
NOT BENEFITTED FROM 
MEMBERSHIPa 
MEMBERSHIP IS A BAD 
THINGa 
AGAINST SINGLE 
CURRENCYb 
  B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B) 
Sex -0.15 0.15 0.86 0.00 0.16 1.00 -0.04 0.17 0.96 
Age 0.00 0.01 1.00 0.00 0.01 1.00 -0.02*** 0.01 0.98 
Left education: Aged 16-
19 
-0.17 0.21 0.84 
-0.34 0.20 0.71 
-0.71*** 0.23 0.49 
Left education: Aged 20+ -0.89*** 0.24 0.41 -0.87*** 0.25 0.42 -1.37*** 0.28 0.25 
Still in education -0.98*** 0.37 0.38 -1.20*** 0.42 0.30 -1.55*** 0.42 0.21 
Occupation: Self-
employed 
-0.08 0.22 0.92 0.25 0.22 1.29 -0.19 0.24 0.83 
Occupation: Manual -0.14 0.24 0.87 -0.06** 0.25 0.94 -0.25 0.29 0.78 
Occupation: Non-manual 0.71** 0.28 2.04 0.59 0.26 1.80 -0.02 0.27 0.98 
Discuss politics -0.04 0.07 0.96 0.09 0.08 1.10 0.00 0.09 1.00 
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Life satisfaction -0.20** 0.09 0.82 -0.33*** 0.09 0.72 0.01 0.10 1.01 
National economy -0.53*** 0.16 0.59 -0.39** 0.18 0.68 -0.19 0.23 0.82 
Trust government -0.84** 0.32 0.43 -1.34*** 0.38 0.26 0.18** 0.38 1.20 
Trust parliament -1.06*** 0.31 0.35 -0.26 0.34 0.77 -1.08 0.51 0.34 
Constant 2.09*** 0.50 8.12 0.71 0.51 2.04 0.85 0.56 2.34 
Weighted N 964 979 928 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.23 0.20 0.06 
Note: ***p≤.01; **p≤.05; *p≤.10. Omitted reference categories: left education aged 15 or under; not in work. 
 
 
 
 
